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History, citizens and morality in the Twentieth Century
Remembering traumatic events in China and Japan
Kurt W. Radtke†
"Crime and suffering are not frightening, indifference and numbness towards crime and suffering
is." Dedication by Lu Yuegang to his book Great country, powerless citizens.
Summary
This paper argues that even in the age of globalization and so-called "borderless society we
need to be aware of the importance of the relationship of individuals to their state. This
relationship is not only determined by the current political system of the state in question, but
also by the historical genesis of state and society. This brings history into the picture, as well as
the moral dimension of the relationship between individual, his society and his state. In Part 1
I discuss the issue of citizenship in relation to individual responsibility and guilt of citizens for
actions committed by his "group" (society, state). Individual and collective responsibility (guilt)
are issues that are important not only in peトmodern society, but also in a secularized state. This
may best be observed by analyzing a traumatic crisis that deeply affects the relationship of the
individual to his society and state. In P,αrt　2 I analyze how the collapse of belief systems
affected this relationship, choosing Japan's moment of defeat as observed in Japanese diary
entries for August 15, 1945, and Chinese sources reflecting on the impact of the Cultural
Revolution on the attitude of individuals towards society and state. In both cases, nationwide
"moral missions ended in violence and moral collapse. In the case of pre-war Japan, pride in
the army was a central factor influencing the attitude of citizens towards their state. Defeat, and
the Tokyo Trial virtually destroyed the roots of such "psychological militarism , bringing about
a radical change in individual attitudes towards the state. In China, the Communist Party
remained in power although it was responsible for launching the Cultural Revolution that was
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not only accompanied by widespread massive violence, but deeply affected all aspects of Chinese
society. In this paper I attempt to develop ways to study the effects of these events on the
"anonymous majority" in China and Japan. In both cases, a central theme is continuity and
discontinuity before and after the event. In Part 3 I focus mainly on literary sources published
in China in recent years to search for clues that may provide answers to the questions raised
above.
Our images of China and Japan still influence the position of both countries in the international
system. It is not just the present economic and political situation that shape the structure of the
relations between the individual, his society and the state. The aftermath of the traumatic
turning points in the history of both countries continue to affect attitudes of citizens of those
two countries, but also their standing in the international arena. This is one reason why issues
such as the responsibility of citizens and their states for actions in the past remain important in
this globalizing age.
Part 1
Citizenship, responsibility and guilt
The Japanese war against China, the tyrannies of Hitler, Stalin, the Great Leap Forward and
the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution caused deep sufferings and death for dozens of million
individuals in Eurasia. This century was truly traumatic: such tragedies should not have
occurred in the modern world, with all its pretence for rationality. One may of course also ask
whether the quest for absolute rationality in politics and economics must not also be partly held
responsible for these accidents. These events are not merely past history. The current position of
countries in the international system is deeply influenced by foreign images of the involvement of
Germany and Japan in the Second World War, just as images of Communist rule in China
continue to be influenced by memories of the Cultural Revolution. Not altogether unrelated is the
fact that citizens of Japan and China seem to have less of a voice among the contemporary
international community than citizens of some other countries.2 The Relationship of citizens to
their respective states is of great importance in this globalizing age, since it also influences
international perceptions of the "defective legitimacy'of some states, which in turn provides one
of the key indicators for an informal ranking of states in the international system. There is a
need to understand clearly how memories of traumatic events of the past continue to shape the
relationship of citizens to their society and state.
2 Citizens of Asias largest democracy India may also feel their voice is seldom heard.
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Another issure that is still with us is the ease with which situations of violence and war give
rise to simplified images of "enemies" who seem to enjoy less human rights than others. Both
fascism and communism created their different varieties of "nonpeople'. Despite the secular
pretences of these modern Western ideologies, they eventually fell prey to temptations of killings
thought to be characteristic for a pre-modern age. Then as now witch hunts and pogroms were
directed against human beings stigmatized as nonpeople. Wang Yi has recently argued that many
features of the Cultural Revolution echo the blood-curdling religions of prehistoric times: even
some of the slogans, such as Husing a big stick" to drive out …evil spirits", "ox ghosts and
snake spirits", and going as far as the ritualistic digging up of graves and cannibalism, suggest
that the primitive past is still with us.3 At the root of this phenomenon is the (in)human
tendency to regard enemies as devils (in German, die Verteufelung des Gegners). Frank
discussions of history may help us to overcome unjustified discrimination. We also need to reflect
on ways to conceptualize these rather difficult and sensitives issues.
Individual and collective responsibility
Should individuals belonging to a "people" or "state be held responsible collectively?
rォI
Collective participation in acts of violence, such as human or animal sacrifice, or even the highly
sublimed expression of bodily in Christian churches, are acts that shape bonds of collective
identity. The secularization of political systems has not necessarily liberated us from a
bloodthirsty past. Modern "systems" all make claims of superior morality for their systems as
:牀�"
such, and this applies equally to communism, socialism, and market democracy. Eventually, most
systems engage in some kind of institutionalized violence, either in self-defense or as open
aggression. The question arises whether all constituents of these systems-i.e., citizens of modern
(nation) states-have to assume individual responsibility for deeds committed in the name of their
stat二eS.
This is, of course, an eternal issue that is also a core issue in the Jewish Torah, couched in
terms of the relation between individual, the people, and the Lord. The citizens of modern nation
states rarely form a homogenous people in the racial sense, and none of the larger modern nation
states could claim racial and religious unity uniting their citizen in a common bond with a
superior being. The quasi-religious claims towards leadership by Hitler, Stalin and Mao Zedong
defy the secularized pretence of modern totalitarianism. Pre-war Japan's 'emperor system clearly
made use of religious attributes for its leader, the Tenno, but the system maintained a careful
I1
3 Wang Yi "Wenhua dageming' yemanxing he cankuxing de wenhua genyuan, pp. 10, 15. One may wonder to what extent
Wang Yi has been influenced by Frank Dikoetter's work (see bibliography).
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distance from the frequently changing political leaders of a modern-style government-Hirota,
Konoe, and Tojo, to mention only a few. "In Japan, there is no general support for the idea that
it was justified to conduct atrocities aganist ordinary Japanese since [government leaders such
as] Tojo and the like were aggressors."4
Secular Citize花ship, responsibility and guilt
The development of the Christian religion and Islam of necessity had to take quite a different
approach concerning the relation of believers towards the respective ethnic groups and state
organizations. The tension between Christian religious institutions and other kinds of political
institutions became a central theme of European history. As I suggested above, there is good
reason to question whether German and Austrian citizens should invariably be treated as
belonging to one group bearing collective responsibility as if they were "one people". Despite, or
exactly because of the mythology of the existence of a German ethnic people created by the
Nazis, one should be rather hesitant to use the argument of ethnic guilt. To avoid any
misunderstanding, this writer holds that the successor state to the Third Reich should, as a
matter of course, shoulder the necessary responsibilities･ It is arguable, however, that moral
responsibility must be born by those directly or indirectly involved in crimes prepetrated. The
perpetrators ought to shoulder the guilt as well. Guilt is related to internalized value systems
(not necessarily religious ones) of those directly involved in wrongdoing, but shouldering
responsibility is a social act that depends on the structure of the socio-political environment. For
that reason, all members of a group should bear responsibility for actions of the group even if
the individual may not be guilty personally.
Nonpeople in China a柁d Japa柁
In past ages Christian churches in Eastern and Western Europe had been linked to
institutionalized violence. During the twentieth century it was some states that instigated violence
involving several hundred million Europeans most of whom probably regarded themselves as
heirs to European Christian civilization in a positive sense. During the twentieth century
Christian institutions appeared to be unable to prevent the wars and massacres executed by
European states and radical political movements. Mass killings and wars of aggression were of
usually accompanied by propaganda that declared large groups of human beings to be either
■ヽ
inferior , or even nonpeople, individuals who were not to be treated as ordinary citizens of their
states. Communist dictatorships as a rule grouped people in terms of "classes", with members of
4 Massatsu sareta nihonjin no gendaishi, p.61.
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Hlandlord" or ㍑reactionary" classes having reduced, or no citizen rights whatsoever. This was not
merely a legal issue. The following quotations from the Chinese novel Fangzhu (Banished,
Driven Out) by Liu Fangwei may illustrate this point.
"The concept of "class struggle" made people regard those belonging to the landlord class
not as human people.' HWhen a landlord died it was impossible to express grief in public,
although there was no special rule on this, any realistic person understood this.
Discrimination continued even after death: "The rules on cremation were very explicit; the
ashes of 〔such〕 people belonging to the four categories (4 lei fenzi) could not be taken
home. '
Japanese prewar state ideology, but also unofficial Asianism advocated the cooperation of peoples
in Asia and stressed the communality of races in Korea and China under Japanese leadership. It
is impossible to draw up a simple picture of the way race relations in Asia developed and
changed after 1868, the foundation of modern Japan. Many Chinese and Japanese supported the
slogan Ha common culture, a common race". This did not prevent both people from portraying
the Henemy" in times of war not only as Hdifferent", but also as "inferior.
))  I
In theory, the Soviet Union was committed to a universalistic approach goving equal rights to
all ethnic groups-in actual fact of ``russifikatsia" from the Baltic to East Asia underlined the
colonial nature of the Russian Soviet Empire. The perversion of communist internationalist ideals
was made all the easier by the elevation of Lenin and Stalin to figures of super-human stature
with quasi-religious attributes. In short, it was not necessarily "secularization that destroyed
traditional positive values-despite the pretence of secularization, some modern states indulged in
the glorification and mystification of "people"(Volk) with a motley assembly of religious
elements.
Responsibility and guilt of moder托citizens
Citizens of these aggressor states-with the exception of those individuals declared nonpeople-were
forced to take part in collective violence perpetrated by their leaders. The nagging question
remains whether the moral responsibility for their crimes should be carried by Hthe system'
itself, a numerically relatively small group of leaders, and to what extent individual citizens who
happened to have (acquired) the nationality of these states should feel morally responsible.
One ought to separate the question of the "political legitimacy" of a state or government, and
the question to what extent an incividual feels morally responsible for the action of the
5 Liu Fangwei Fangヱhu, p. 458.
6 Liu Fangwei Fangzhu, p. 460.
7 Liu Fangwei Fangzhu, p. 466.
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government of the state of which he is a citizen. Linked to this is the question whether a
modern secular government should be seen as an expression of the will of an imagined or real
'people", with its long-term moral responsibility, and whether individual citizens of a secular
state should feel moral responsibility for actions of the state as a representative of his "people''
These are issues which must be raised in an age indulging in ideas about a "borderless" world
and globalization-although I will be the first one to admit that globalization certainly des not
imply internationalism old style.
Perhaps the larger part of the world's population lives in countries that do not more or less
coincide with a long shared history-and the same may be said of countries like Australia, and the
United States. An immigrant acquiring US citizenship by 1980 can hardly bear responsibility for
what happened during the Vietnam War -and should individual citizens of Iraq -which consists
of several larger different ethnic/religious groups-be all held responsibe for the deeds of the
Saddam government, governing a country whose borders were drawn up by a colonial power?
((  I  ◆  I)
In China, civic responsibility is still a sensitive issue, since advocating incividual responsibility
invariably undermines the claim by the Party to set moral standards. The relation between
private, public and social morality is usually not a static one, but changes in the course of
history. During the twenties there were numerous articles in China on kokkashugi, the idea of the
state, such as by Li Huang.8 Li Huang argued that in Chinese history for thousands of years
private, family, and individual morality were at the center, but not civic responsibility.9 Such
views were fairly common during the prewar period. Like others, Li Huang is fascinated by the
idea that Jews too preserved their national identity even during long when they did not have a
state.10
In a recent interview the brother of the Emperor, Mikasanomiya recalled that during the war
Japanese were convinced that China had not known nationalism in the sense of having a concept
of state (kokka kannen).
"Being a true Chinese means following familism."ll
To sum up, questions of trauma, guilt and responsibility have a close bearing on the relation of
individual to society, religious and secular institution. In discussiong these issues with respect to
the recent history of China and Japan it will therefore be necessary to place them in the context
of the different structure of the social, political and moral heritage of both countries.
8 "Kokkashugi shakugi Li Huang," in Pekin mantetsu geppoo tokukan, No.5.
9 "Kokkashugi shakugi Li Huang," in Pekin mantetsu geppoo tokukan, No.5, p. 19-20
10 "Kokkashugi shakugi Li Huang," in Pekin mantetsu geppoo tokukan, No.5, p. 18.
ll Nakano Kunimi et al. "Yami ni hoomurareta kooshitsu no gunbu hihan. Sanboo/Mikasanomiya no "kikenbunsho"
hakken, in This is Yomiuri, August 1994, pp. 40-88.
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Part2
Reacting to traumatic events. The post-war period in Japan and the Cultural Revolution
in China
I first focus on the reactions of individuals in China and Japan to traumatic events within their
own countries, such as the Japanese defeat and surrender in 1945, and the consequences of the
Cultural Revolution (late sixties) and its aftermath in China･ In this paper the emphasis is on
reactions by the "anonymous majority" which, while living through these events, have not
received attention as victims of particular cruelty. I believe that both in China and Japan
collective memories exist that are not suitably expressed in official sources and statements, and
which do have do have a bearing on the way memories of these historical events are constructed,
and the way they are forgotten as well. Huge numbers of people in China, Japan, Germany and
elsewhere appear to have sincerely believed in causes and ideologies which they more or less
suddenly had to abandon. To many these beliefs had appeared to be a genuine, if not "holy
cause. The sudden, often unexpected profanation and desecration of such beliefs was followed by
the accusation that having believed means having been gulllible, if not outright (dangerously)
stupid and criminal as well. Questions of individual and collective responsibility arise. The
answers seem obvious, certainly answers to be given in the public place, but individuals often
attempt to bypass clear answers, and this often also applies to political parties, governments, and
states. In some societies "official histories" {zhengshi) are entrusted with the task of settling
issues and providing "final" judgment. How to settle differences of historical judgement among
nations has become a very real issue in international relations, as in East Asia, and moves have
been made to set up joint committees of historians from former enemy countries to establish
"correct history". To this one may reply that the writing of history can never be closed, nor
does history itself ever come to a conclusion･ Despite the great political relevance of the
historical past on international relations, neo-realist theories of international relations usually pay
insufficient attention to its significance.
The question of sources-the end of the war in Japan
There is a huge amount of literature written in many languages on issues related to Japans
wars, civil war and the Cultural Revolution in China. Even half a century after the Japanese
war in China we are still far removed from the compilation of histories that present systematic
and balanced analyses on the basis of sources published by communist and non communist,
Chinese, Japanese and non-Asian sources. Numerous studies of the impact of the last war on
Japan focus on the effects of Japan's fight and surrender against (mainly) US forces, or are
devoted to Japan's military actions in one of the numerous war theatres in Asia. Studying the
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impact on psychological reactions by individuals, communities, and Japan as a whole requires an
insight in the complexity of the way the "two wars" -the one on the Asian mainland and the
war against the United States, interacted. I dealt with this issue in a separate study.12 In this
paper I will focus mainly on one published selection of Japanese diary extracts of the day of
defeat, August 15, 1945･ Since this paper deals with this specific aspect of Japanese reactions on
the day of defeat I will not refer to some larger issues, such as the role of the Yasukuni Shrine
in the remembrance of the war.14 Despite the existence of a research field on the construction of
collective memories, what has been said about the Vietnam War may be equally true for other
wars:
'The war in the consciousness of the Vietnamese themselves is even much more difficult to
assess, despite the many memoirs, personal recollections and occasional meetings between scholars
and between former enemies."15
The Cultural Revolution
By now we can speak of studies on the Cultural Revolution as a particular branch of the
scientific study of China. It has been the subject of numerous conferences, and archives have
been established around the world, partially accessible through internet. The Harvard-Yenching
Libary, the Hoover Institute Library, and the East Asia Library at the University of Michigan,
to mention only a few, have established special collections. Among recent conferences, the
workshop on China's Cultural Revolution: political causes and social consequences," held at the
CPAS at Stockholm University in 1995, Sweden deserves special mention. In this study I will
focus on the way Chinese literary sources reflect the events and memories of the Cultural
Revolution. I will not discuss the veracity of their descriptions, but analyze the way the Cultural
Revolution is remembered in these sources.
Reactions to traumatic events
Collapse of belief systems and the continuity and rupture of socio-political systems
At the moment belief systems collapse, individuals are challenged to re-examine the way they
were individually bonded and linked to the imagined community of the past. It is clear that at
such turning points the relationship between "citizen" and society, and his/her state will
12 At the time this paper was written I had no access yet to John Dower's recent book Embracing Defeat, which deals with
some of these issues.
13 There are numerous other sources such as Doojitudookoku: taiheiyoo sensoo kaisen no ichinichi to shuusen no 15nichi by
Yamada Futaro, 1979 (I owe this reference to Yoda Yoshiie).
14 Murakami Shigeyoshi, Irei to shookon-Yasukuni no shisoo, Iwanami shinsho, 1974 (reprint 1995).
15 Kleinen,"The Vietnam War", pp. 345-368.
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undergo an important change. It seems impossible to present a statistically valid survey of
changes in individual attitude towards society and the state in reponse to such transitions. As
time goes by, historians, the destroyers and creators of myths present their own evaluations, and
together with other unofficial and official sources of opinion create a new web of memories that
seeks to fix the past in a static, manageable image.三6 This includes moves to create joint teams
of Chinese and Japanese historians to "settle history" in a quasトofficial way, as it were, in order
to lay the foundations for a better future history. The citizens of China, Japan, the Soviet Union
and Germany found themselves in quite different environments after the period of trauma had
ended: Germany was divided and placed under direct military administration, Japan was
occupied, but did neither suffer division nor direct military rule. The Soviet Union collapsed,
and it is only in China that the major institution ruling the country at the time, the Chinese
Communist Party, is still in power. It should not surprise, then, that the processes of dealing
with the past differ considerably, not just at the official, but also at the individual level. After
the Cultural Revolution the Party often avoided drawing a clear line between victims and
perpetrators -it wanted to lay the blame for the Cultural Revolution on a limited number of
people. In this way, it was hoped, the Party could largely avoid being blamed for this tragedy
itself.
The "moral mission of the Chinese Communist Party
In China, the Communist Party tried, during the height of its dictatorial powers, to create an
awareness of "proletarian morality" and "proletarian loyalty" that would bond Chinese citizens
not to the state, but rather to the party. This process facilitated a double exclusiveness: a
privileged group of people standing above the mass of citizens of the state, and an excluded
group nonpeople who were actually prevented from enjoying any legal protection.
Modern Chinese nationalism did not automatically imbue members of Chinese society with an
acceptance of collective responsibility as members of the Chinese people or a state, quite apart
from the position of ethnic groups other than the so-called "Han". The "belief crisis that
emerged full force during the eighties and virtually destroyed what had remained of the moral
authority of the Communist Party, also raised questions about the relationship between Chinese
individuals and their bond with the Chinese state. As was the case in the past, especially in non-
urban areas of China we are witnessing a revival of traditional clan structures where the
individual owes its first loyalty not to the state as a member of the Chinese "people , but to his
くく
16 Radtke,=Troubled Identity", in China's Modernisation: Westernization and Acculturation, Kurt W. Radtke and T. Saich
eds. Stuttgart 1993, p.37.
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respective clan.1 These issues come to the fore in the way responsibility for the cultural
Revolution is concepturalized. The official view has been that the suffering had been caused by
the usurpation of the CCP by a few "corrupt leaders". As early as the seventies dissidents like
Wen Yizhe had ventured beyond, blaming the totalitarianism of the Party as such. More
recently, some writers questioned whether social and cultural traditions of Chinese society (or the
Chinese poeple) may not also have contributed to events such as the Great Leap Forward and
the Cultural Revolution. There have been relatively few thorough discussions about the way this
discourse influences the civic consciousness of citizens of the Chinese state.
It may come as a surprise that in the post-war period few Japanese see the Japanese "people" as
such as responsible for Japan's acts of aggression against its Asian neighbors, and the war
against the Allied countries. As the war progressed numerous Japanese soldiers were actively
trained to regard Chinese, for instance, as lesser human beings. Forced participation in collective
violence was one of the means to numb individual pangs of conscience, so vividly described by
Shikada Masao in his account of bayonet practice on live Chiese prisoners of war. One aim and
consequence was also the destruction of pride and self-esteem among the perpetrators themselves.1
The moral mission" of Meiji Japan
The development of the modern Japanese state also saw appeals to Japanese racial superiority
which clearly echo nineteenth century European racial theories. In this sense, Japan followed the
ways of those European secularized totalitarian parties that created their own myths about their
respective "peoples. Despite the strong` awareness of "being Japanese" there is little sense of the
continued responsibility of the post-war young generation of Japanese for the actions committed
by pre-war Japan. The recent book by Sakaiya Taiichi (current Head of the Economic Planning
Agency, see below) attempts a rational explanation. His rationalizing explanation emphasizes the
hollownes" (fancy charactoer, kuusoo) of Japanese propaganda for an emperor state. He regards
this feature as a fairly short term aberration. He argues that prewar and postwar Japan were
basically poised towards the creation of a strong modern ecomony.19 It would be difficult to deny
17 The revival of Hclan norms (zongfa) in parts of China has created an eveironment in which the individual is easily
subject to social control by traditional clans in society. This creates a latent danger for the state, since it constitutes
reversal of a contemporary pattern of individual social responsibility towards the state in the direction of the traditional
pattern "individual-clan-society". He Qinglian Xiandaihuade xianjing, pp. 282 ff.
18 Shikada Masao "Sankoo (Sanguang) sakusen to tameshikiri," sekai, (tokushuu: kagai no shoogen. (7. 7) Rokookyoo
jiken 60nen), July 1997, p. 98-104. My article HNegotiations Between the PRC and Japan on the Return of Japanese
Civilians and the Repatriation of Prisoners of War" contains numerous comments on the issue of Japanese war crimes as
seen from China. For a report on a Japanese delegation of former soldiers to China, see "Riben jiu junren daibiaotuan
fangwen feigu zhi jianwen , in Feiqing guancha baogao, vol. 2, January 1957, pp. 33-54. On Japanese "refuseniks"
opposing the war, see Akiyama Yoshiaki, Chuugoku sensen no hansen heishi.
19 Sakaiya Taiichi Jidaimatsu, p. 107 ff.
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that since the Meiji Reform numerous Japanese felt very strongly about the moral mission the
Japanese people carried, and their moral obligations towards Asia as a whole. This should not
simply be seen in terms of some facile "nationalism'.20　Studying the reactions of individual
Japanese to the surrender of August 1945 few express sorrow or anger at the failure to achieve
such a Japanese moral mission. Japan's surrender was not necessarily conceptualized as "defeat ,
major difference to the German experience of "defeat in May 1945 (see the references to
"defeat" in the diaries referred to below). In the awareness of most Japanese, surrender was
caused by US military superiority at sea and in the air, followed by the sudden and unexpected
early end to the war through the use of nuclear weapons. This left many Japanese with the
feeling that they had not been defeated in the war on the Asian continent. In my view the
different conduct of war against the allies under US leadership and in Asian war theatres has
complicated images of the war, especially when it comes to discussions of atrocities committed in
Asia.21 One of the purposes of the Tokyo Tribunal was to establish a clear parallel between the
defeat of the German people as a people carrying collective responsibility, and the Japanese
situation. Japanese writers of the left, the center and the right have consistently denied the
applicability of the German precedent for establishing a Tokyo trial, since according to them
Japan had not engaged in the kind of collective genocide aganist nonpeople that was a major
ウり
charge aganist Germany∴-
The pride of Japa托: the role of the Japanese army in modern natio托building'
There have been few discussions in Japan concerning issues such as guilt by association, or
responsibilities emanating from indirect involvement in Japan's prewar aggression. Following
Shimada Kazushige I would argue that even more so than the emperor system one should seek
the roots of Japan's aggression in the ability of the army to establish itself as the symbol for
20 Kawashima Naniwa was a Japanese deeply involved in Mongolian "independence movements striving for autonomy, or
full independence from China. His convictions were not merely driven by jingoistic Japanese nationalism, but by the kind
of sense of mission characteristic for co一onialism everwhere. See the text of a confidentia一 speech of his listed in the
bibliography.
21 Japan was the only Asian democratic modern nation state included into the posトwar common camp of anit･communist
states under U.S. leadership. The victims of Japanese aggressions-whether communist or anti-communist-with few
exceptions developed into dictatorships whose human right credentials were extremely dubious, and this includes the two
Koreas, Communist China, Taiwan, and the countries of Southeast Asia. West Germany remained rather reluctant to
aceept proof of war crimes supplied by Communist governments, which were frequently supplied selectively with clear
political motives, and Japan showed a similar reluctance. Compare Himeta Mitsuyoshi, 92 if.
22　Massatsu sareta nihonjin no gendaishi, p. 116-7, The Tribunal has been frequently blamed for applying here an
inappropriate (Western) view of history to the history of pre-war Japan (cf. Sakaiya Taiichi Jidaimatsu, p. 129).
Comparisons between German and Japanese dealing with war responsibiliy are found in Kuriya Kentaro et al, Sensoo
sekinin.
23 For a recent relevant study, see Peter Wetzler Hirohito and War.
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the new, and successful, Japan.24 Whereas pride in the Japanese army-especially following the
defeat of Russia contributed to its subsequent unchallengeable status, Hitler's tyranny fed on
feelings of revenge for Germany's defeat in the First World War, and the weakness of the
Weimar Republic. This differnce of outlook among German and Japanese citizens may be one of
the reasons for the difference of general emotional reactions towards the past.
Taking pride modern style national armies dates back to the time of Napoleon when all children
longed to become a soldier of Napoleon. In Japan, soldiers became models for the citizen of the
new nation. Japans pride in the army was not invariably linked to issues of morality, but in a
sense, pride itself became a moral value.25 As Shimada pointed out, putting up the issue of the
Nanking massacre in the Tokyo trial aimed to destroy the charisma of the Japanese army within
Japan once and for all. The US succeeded in this way perhaps more effectively to uproot the
core of the pre-war state than if it had focused on the Japanese emperor personally as the root
of all evil. 6 The psychological importance of the Nanking Massacre also relies on the fact that it
draws a clear and explicit parallel between acts of genocide by Nazi Germany and pre-war
Japan. Destroying Japan's pride was one thing, but this did not lead to feelings of collective
guilt so important for an understanding of post-war German history. Japan's reluctance to
apologize to its neighbors during the fifties, sixties and seventies may also be related to the fact
that this would have meant that the newborn democracy should bow its head to the dictatorial
governments of neighboring countries in Asia such as Communist China.
Remembering the past: the Japanese Left
It would be wrong, however, to suggest that Japan as a whole subsequently simply ignored, or
forgot its war past. The outlook of the socialist and communist parties who consistently polled
more than　30%　of the votes during the fifties blamed the peculiar combination of premature
capitalism and a still partly feudal society for the development of "Japan's own brand of
fascism. In a sense, this view is structurally not too dissimilar from those American views that
24 Massatsti sareta nihonjin no gendaishi, pp. 107, 116-7.
25 Massatsu sareta nihonjin no gendaishi, p. 107.
26 Massatsu sareta nihonjin no gendaishi, p. 116-7.
27 The Nanking Massacre started to play a significant role in the evaluation of Japan's conduct in Japan only well into the
occupation period. For this reason only, I dispense with a treatment within the framework of this paper. On the
importance of "Nanking", see for instance Noda Masaaki HSensoo to zaiseki. Nihonhei ni okeru [kanashimi] no mondai,"
in Sekai. (tokushuu: kagai no shoogen. (7.7) Rokookyoo jiken 50nen), July 1997, p. 150-160. The report compiled by
Hsu Shuhsi, A Digest of Japanse War Conduct is a striking example of a contemporay source on HNanking" which
strives meticulously to report only facts observed by reliable witnesses. For a recent Japanese comment, see Hata Ikuhiko's
contribution in Japan Echo, August 1998. See also Joshua Fogel ed. The Nanjing Massacre in History and
Historiography, University of California, 1999.
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regard the depression of 1929, and Japan's peculiar structure of business conglomerates that
cooperated with military leaders as a major cause for Japan's "aberration" from the path towards
true parliamentary democracy.28 But even beyond the left, contrary to the general impression
outside Japan, there has been a continuous stream of critical publications in Japanese on the war,
and Ienaga Saburo is only one among many.-
The Cultural Revolutio托i柁　China. Whose pride, whose responsibility? Army, party a絶d
state i托　Chi托a
In China, the communist armies played a major role in the building of a new, unified nation
state; for long periods, the army was able to claim that it had been able to defend the "correct
(socialist/communist) line more faithfully even than the CCP itself. Differing from Japan where
adulation of the army became a main reason for Japan's policies of aggression the PLA was not
regarded as the root of the evils of the Cultural Revolution, although the image became certainly
tainted by the appearance of Lin Biao's "party soldiers". In China it was not the army that had
((
formed the "moral" core of the nation. Neverthless, we should not underestimate that in China,
too, the descriptions of war in novels clearly depicts how legends of new heroism linked nation
building (minzuhua), the creation of mass society (dazhonghua) and the spirit of a new age, in
novels couched in peasants' language. Pan Xianwei argues that the mentality of the war
literature still reflects traditional ideas of the gentry elite (shidafu).30 The role of "war" (civil
wars as well as wars against foreign armies) has so far mainly been studied from its
implications for the rise of nationalism, while its role in the building of an awareness of a
modern Chinese state has received less attention. The awareness of being "Chinese works
differently in a period where China is merely one among numerous "nation states , and no longer
the center of the known world. For this reason it is futile to search for defenitions of ethnicity
that are consistently, and equally applicable for the past as well as the present.
28 One of the earliest contemporary serious discussions about the issue of Hfascism" in Japan is found in the Selected Works
of Hasegawa Nyozekan, a liberal journalist. Hasegawa Nyozekan senshuu. Vol･ 2, 1969.
29　See e.g. the Oral history project of Tokyo University, Tokutei Kenkyuu [bunゑa masatsu] , published in numerous
volumes during the eighties by the International Relations Research Center of the Kyooyoo Faculty, Tokyo University.
Contributions by Arai Shin'ichi, Yoshimi Yosiaki and Yoshida Yutaka to the quarterly journal Kikan sensoo sekinin
kenkyuu, published by the Nihon no sensoo sekinin shiryoo senta http://ww¥v･jca.ax.apc.org/JWRC/index.html, are
more recent examples of Japanese attempts to cope with the question of war responsibility.
30 Pan Xianwei …Lun Zhong Su Zhanzheng xiaoshuo shenmei de qutongxing he chayixing, p. 42･
31 Deng Fan Chuantong ming yu xiandai minzu guojia, passim. I have dealt with this theme in my paper entitled
"National Identity in China and Japan. Intended and Unintended Consequences of Japan's Expansion on the Asian
Continent", presented at a Workshop held at the Nordic Institure of Asian Studies (Copenhagen) on 18 June 1999.
Anthropologists are usually loath to apply the term Hnation" or "people" in a "racial sense. See for instance, Emily
Honig Creating Chinese ethnicity: Subei People in Shanghai, 1850-1980･
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Violence: aggression or self-defense? The League of Nations, the United Nations, and
supra･national morality
Finally, I should raise another point which is unfortunately of particular relevance today.
Questions of national" (if not a "people's") guilt and responsibility are closely linked to the
question of whether military actions beyond borders are acts of aggression, or should on the
contrary be interpreted as actions in selトdefense. One of the major purposes of the establishment
of the United Nations at its inception was the condemnation of Japan and Germany as
"aggressor nations", and the prevention of future wars. The ability and/or legitimacy of the
United Nations to act as a supranational moral arbiter had never been universally accepted, and
was once more thrown into doubt in the current war in Central Europe. This should not come as
a surprise. No (secularized) institution can discharge the function of a universal moral arbiter.
Questions of moral judgment rest with each individual, and cannot be subject to (democratic)
vote, or a system of representation.32　By the same token, military actions of democratic
governments against other states are not inherently "moral", even if directed against non-
democratic dictators.
The brother of the Showa Emperor, Mikasanomiya, argued in a rare interview that with the
departure of Japan from the League "Japan turned the whole world into its enemy. Subsequently,
the feeling got lost from the hearts that Japan had to keep international law". He seemed to
imply that for Japan at that time "supra-national morality" was part of a modernized,
international world represented by the League of Nations, and not a set of internalized values.31
Reacting to traumatic events: the "anonymous majority" in China and Japan
The term "traumatic events" has long been overused, and shown inflationary devaluation.
Modern psychiatry has for several decades engaged in research on the causes and consequences of
"trauma". So far, there have been relatively few broadly based studies of the effects of
individual trauma on the history of societies as a whole, with the exception of Israel perhaps.
There exists no generally accepted methodology to classify and generalize the human experience of
hundreds of millions of people exposed to widely varying impact of violence and war. The
widespread awareness of 'trauma'in its clinical sense is in fact of very recent date. Twenty
years ago trauma researchers in Europe complained about having insufficeint numbers of patients
32 Partly due to the recent bombing of Yugoslavia by NATO there have been increasing doubts concerning the continued
authority of the Security Council of the UN to approve or reject military actions as being in self defense.
33 "Sanboo/Mikasanomiya no "kikenbunsho" hakken", in This is Yomiuri, August 1994, pp. 40-88, esp. p. 64,
34 Interview with Prof. dr. Rolf Kleber, Catholic University Brabant, Netherlands, in Volkskrant, 13 March 1999.
35 John J. Sigal The Nature of Evidence for lntergenerations Effects of the Holocaust,
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for conducting research of their syndrome.34　Moreover, we have to take into account the
possibility that effects of traumas are transmitted to the following generation.35 In China, there
are far fewer trauma specialists as a percentage of the population, but there is also a lack of a
general awareness of trauma as a syndrome. This does not mean trauma did not exist. There
have been some studies about the impact of events such as the Cultural Revolution on individual
personality, but it is fairly difficult to find suitable sources describing mass reactions to
traumatic events, especially where the expression of such reactions may be culturally conditioned.
Needless to add that field research in a country like China is encumbered by the sheer size of
the country and the fact that conditions vary not only among macro-regions, but may differ
substantially even among neighboring villages. Non-Chinese researchers, but also Chinese
researchers with little background knowledge of a particular village (and its dialect) may find it
quite difficult to conduct interviews without local assistance-trust necessary for such research is
not easily gained, even if there were no (local or other) political pressures. On many issues
involving social transformations and individual reactions literary sources are therefore a welcome
aid. There, however, we find a truly staggering amount of published literature: counting "long
novels" (changpian xiaoshuo) alone, the number published has been around one thousand per
year. For purposes of research the particular Chinese genre of "reporting Literature (baogao
wenxue) is particularly interesting. They are often published locally, or in regional serial
publications not easily available.38 It is obvious that at this stage no systematic survey of literary
sources is feasible, and that my selection of works consulted is of necessity fairly arbitrary.
Conti花uities and discont血uities: the developmental state, and the Emperor in prewar a推d
postwar Japan
The comparative study of continuties and discontinuities in China and Japan has to take into
account the impact of war and violence on the cohesion of communities in both countries,
36 Mia Turner "Up from the snake pit After decades of hiding its mental illnesses, China is once again turning to the
practice of Psychiatry. Time International, European edition, November 6, 1995 (vol. 146, no. 19). A fairly early study is
by Anita Chan, Children of Mao: personality development and political activism in the Red Guard generation, Seattle,
University of Washington Press 1985. Please refer to the endnote for detailed bibliographic information.
37　As I stressed decades ago in doing research on literary traditions other than ones own, one has to accept that the
definition of literary genres, and the disstribution of literature over various genres differs in Chinese, Japanese and
English language literatures. This has important implications for the (literary) evaluation of sources that are all too often
ignored. Baogao wenxue stands in the Chinese literary tradition of striving towards verisimilitude. The dramatization of
events by the "reporting writer" allows the concrete presentation of insights which (Western) traditions of analytic
sometimes fails to catch.
38 For a general survey of recent literature dealing with social change in China, see e.g. Hagino Shuuji Chuugoku "Shin
jiゑi bungaku ronkoo. shisoo kaihoo no sakkagun. 1995　Kansai daigaku shuppanbu. There of course numerous other
surveys on recent Chinese literature. An interesting study is by Qi Shuyu Shichang jingjixia de之hongguo wenxue yishu,
Beijing daxue chubanshe, Beijing, 1998, who uses the post-modernist approach suggested by Frederic Jameson.
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communities that were also deeply affected by political events such as the occupation of Japan,
the changes imposed by the Chinese Communist Party, and industrialization and urbanization.
This is particularly relevant when considering issue related to the question of individual and
collective responsibilities and guilt.
I should like to introduce here the views of Sakaiya Taiichi on the link between prewar and
postwar Japan, as presented in the second volume of his recent book entitled End of a period
(Jidaimatsu). Sakaiya is not only a well-known commentator on social and political issues, but
currently also Head of the Economic Planning Agency of the Japanese government.
Since the nineties in discussions with youngsters entering high school I was sruck by the
fact that they have virtually no interest and no knowledge about the Pacific War. There are
some who view the whole of the actions of prewar Japan in extremely bad terms as taught
by members of the leftist teachers union (Nikkyoso), but this is a story completely unrelated
to their own existence. For them, cruelties by the Japanese army in China and the holocaust
of Nazi Germany are similarly crimes committed by others in the far distant past'
In Sakaiyas view, this is related to the disappearance of moral communities at the level of
family and neighborhood as one of the relevant features in modern urbanized Japan.40 Japan
succeeded in rapid postwar reconstructin despite the collapse of the "Great Japanese Empire".
According to him this was possible since Japanese prewar society had also internalized different
concepts of a modern industrializing society, concepts in agreement with those propounded by the
occupation forces. Our analysis of pre-war Japan should take into account that social discourse in
terms of the "Empire was but one side of the coin-the tatemae, so to speak, while other
concepts of a modern industrialized society were hidden from direct view (honne).
Military and civil officials as well as business all aiming towards a modern industrial
society geared towards mass production had compromised with fancy (kuusooteki) Japanists
pleading for a patriarchal emperor system. 41
He concedes that some may object stongly to this interpretation, since historical sources appear to
show that Japan was willing to sacrifice concepts of a modern economy and society to those of a
militarized emperor state. In this view, we cannot simply identify the contents of written sources
with the ultimate goals cherished by society.
"In such a situation, the intentions of organizations at a distance from s一ate goals, and the
hysterics of the abnormal situation on war play their own role. We may argue that the
39 Sakaiya Taiichi Jidaimatsu, p. 100.
40 Sakaiya Taiichi Jidaimatsu, p. 102.
41 Sakaiya Taiichi Jidaimatsu, pp. 107-111.
42 Sakaiya Taiichi Jidaimalsu, pp. 110-ll.
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Japanese Empire in its final phase was in a situation where the honne and tatemae were
considerably at variance.�"�"蝣When the Pacific War intensified - the deficencies in military
strength and the absence of feelings of moral justice (seigikan) became apparent
He subsequently points out that even in purely organizational terms, Japanese military forces
were not truly unified (as they ought to be in a modern nation state).
"In addition, contemporary Japanese neither had the ability nor the enthiユsiasm to spread the
ideals of their patriarchal emperor system abroad. -　The establishment of Shinto temples
based on traditional myths of the Japanese people was merely a means of gaining points in
domestic politics."44
Sakaiya subsequently explains Japan's reckless war (muboo na sensoo) not as an abandonment of
modernization and economism (keizaishugi), but as a way to secure the means for modernization
such as the assured supply of raw materials.45 It was in his view this particular structure of
Japan that explains why the emperor could fuは11 a key role in making Japanese leaders accept
surrender, and once the leaders had accepted surrender, make the people accept surrender.4
Like Nakasone Yasuhiro and some other politicians, Sakaiya goes to considerable lengths to
exonerate the Emperor from any participation in crimes committed by the Japanese govenment in
his name.` Sakaiya obviously accepts a division of awareness among more "rationally oriented
leaders and ordinary Japanese who had been educated to believe in the absolute authority of the
emperor. He adds, however, that while being caught in their ideas about the emperor state,
Japanese at all levels had in fact already lost confidence in victory. The acceptance of surrender
by the emperor resulted in a rather surprising situation, namely the relative absence of a genuine
feeling of defeat both among the people and the leaders. The latter were under the impression
that there would be no need for a drastic change of Japanese politics and administration.
Sakaiya explains the smooth course of demobilization as due to the fact that "originally, the
Japanese are a peaceful people, not familiar with weapons. ◆　Despite the authority exercised by
MacArthur and his occupation headquarter Sakaiya stresses that Japan was the only country
defeated in the second world war which did not suffer direct military rule, and ascribes a deep
significance to this fact.50. He also refers to a speech by former prime minister Kaifu Toshiki
43 Sakaiya Taiichi Jidaimatsu, pp. 105-6.
舶Sakaiya Taiichi Jidaimatsu, pp. 106-7
45 Sakaiya Taiichi Jidaimaisu, p. 107.
46 Sakaiya Taiichi Jidaimatsu, pp. 122-3.
47 Sakaiya Taiichi Jidaimatsu, pp. 114ff. This tendency is also evident in the articles collected in "Sanboo/Mikasanomiya
no "kikenbunsho hakken , in This is Yomiuri, August 1994, pp. 40-88.
48 Sakaiya Taiichi Jidaimatsu, pp. 122-3.
49 Sakaiya Taiichi Jidaintatsu, p. 126.
50 Sakaiya Taiichi Jidaimatsu, p. 127.
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who during a visit to the United States quoted a post-war popular song: "a dream in my right
pocket, a chewing gum in my left one", to reflect the feelings of ordinary Japanese soon after the
surrender, with its easy switch from the emperor ideology to a materialistically oriented
economism.
The day of surrender in Japanese diaries
In this brief survey on the publication of diary entries for the few days from August 15, 1945
gathered in Ei Rokusuke's book.52 Generally speaking these entries present a much more complex
)
picture than Sakaiyas view summarized above. First of all, there are frequent references to the
willingness, or the individual belief in the ability of Japan to continue the fight.53 As in Germany
we encounter the belief that the use of miracle weapons such as poisonous gas more powerful
than nuclear bombs was imminent.54 Japan's surrender was frequently met with expressions of
disbelief.55 Many reacted by crying for as long as twenty or thirty minutes at the very realization
that "Japan had been broken" (yabureta).m Some Japanese walked hand in hand, like children,
crying.
There are usually very few concrete indications of what exactly defeat would mean-not surprising,
perhaps, for a nation that had never had to face an occupation of its homeland in its long
history. Many were deeply saddened by the realization that surrender meant that all personal
sacrifices, especially when remembering close relatives that had died in the war, turned out to
have been in vain.58 There were reports of suicides, most famous of which was the suicide by the
minister for the army, Anami.59 Although the occupation itself passed relatively orderly, there
were also scattered reports of looting, and even active opposition to the surrender (such as
reports concerning the Konoe Unit).60 Ordinary people had been thrown into the war withour
being aware of what was.happening, and the end of the war came just as sudden and
unexpectedly. Some were apprehensive about the coming burden of reparations, and the
51 Sakaiya Taiichi Jidaimatsu, pp. 130-1.
52 Ei Rokusuke Hachigalsu juugonichi no mikki, Kodansha, 1995. For a recent Western study, see Frank Gibney, Senso:
The Japanese Remember the Pacific War, M E Sharpe, 1995.
53 Hachigatsu juugonichi no nikki, pp. 132, p. 136.
54 Hachigatsu juugonichi no nikki, p. 132.
55 Kido Kooichi, Hachigatsu juugonichi no nikki, p. 40, and see also pp. 134f. and feelings of bewilderdness, p. 2.
56 Hachigatsu Juugonichi no nikki, p. 21.
57 Hachigatsu Juugonichi no nikki, p. 40.
58 Hachigatsu Juugonichi no nikki, p. 157.
59 Hachigatsu Juugonichi no nikki, p. 2.
60 Hachigatsu Juugonichi no nikki, p. 2.
61 Takahashi Aiko, housewife, in Hachigatsu Juugonichi no Nikki, . 35.
62 See the diary entries by two writers, Tsuboi Shigeji, p. 167, Nagayo Yoshiroo and Umezaki Haruo, all in Hachigatsu
juugonichi no nikki, pp. 171-2.
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difficulties of reconstructing the Japanese economy and society.62 Perhaps surprisingly, the diaries
make virtually no mention of the fear of revenge by the occupying forces, and there are a
number who at the moment of surrender look forward to reconstruct Japan as a way to overcome
defeat. This is most clearly expressed by a member of the imperial family:
"How can we face our ancestors now that we are losing an imperial state (kokutai) that has
lasted for three thousand years? We added a stain on three thousand years of shining
Japanese history-ah, all is finished
But rather than remaining in this self-pitying mood, she continues:
We now have to develop science, and build an even more splendid Japan.--- In response to
the emperor's gracious heart heart our citizens will do their best to strive for the countrys
development.別
A business leader like Murata Shoozoo welcomed the end to the battering of Japan, and a new
chance for the reconstruction under the occupation. The coming occupation was clearly not seen
in terms of a threat of revenge, but as a period for the reconstruction of Japan.
Little, or rather no thought is given to the sacrifices inflicted on Koreans, Chinese, Americans
and others attacked by Japan. Different from the situation in Germany where Germans were
particularly afraid of the occupation by the Soviet Red Army, Japanese in the homeland had
apparently little personal apprehension about the coming occupation. There are only few diary
entries that spend some thought about what the end of the war may mean in terms of the
suppression of Japanese in Korea and Manchuria.66 These diaries reflect emotions at the instant
of surrender. It took some time before Japan started to tackle the question of who was to blame
for the outbreak of war, and to look into the deeper causes of the war.
Conspiracy for war? Who had led Japa柁　to attack the Asia花mainland, and subseque柁tly
the United States?
Japanese leadership before and during the during the war changed frequently, and none of the
leaders-including Tojo-ever achieved a quasi-permanent position of national leadership. There was
little belief in the "personal leadership' by Japanese politicians, rather a general feeling of
obligation towards the country, symbolized in loyalty towards the emperor. The emperor himself
does not appear as an active leader engaged in the conduct of the war, and the refusal by the
United States to charge him with war crimes further contributed to the feeling of diffusion of
63 Nashinomotonomiya Ituko in Hachigatsu juugonichi no nikki, p. 23,
64 Id. See also Otabe Yuuji ed. Nanihomotomiya ltsuko hi no nikki, Shoogakkan 1991.
65 Hachigatsu juugonichi no nikki, p. 43, p. 160.
66 Hachigatsu Juugonichi no nikki, pp. 17ト2, the writer Umezaki Haruo. It may be added that some other collections of
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leadership. The size and depth of the actual purges was far smaller than originally anticipated;
the occupation itself was scheduled to last for a considerable time, but was cut short by the
United States in the context of the outbreak of the Korean War. While the left engaged in soul-
searching about the social for the outbreak of Japanese fascism, few Japanese would be
prosecuted for war crimes in Japan itself.
There was clearly a sense of loss of direction in the early phase after Japan's surrender. The
vagueness of the actual content of the Emperor system, in the name of which the war had been
conducted, and the continued functioning of the Emperor as an institution, albeit robbed of its
'god-like" status (a misleading term), also implied that the breakdown of the "belief system" in
Japan led to less soul-searching than was the case in Germany, where the monstrosity of Nazi
rule had annihilated the pretence of German society as standing in the tradition of a humanist,
Christian European civilization. Generally speaking, no such fundamental questioning took place
in Japan; few individuals seem to have asked similar fundamental questions about their
individual relationship towards the society they belonged.67
Part　3
The Great Prolearian Cultural Revolutio柁: just the work of the "Ga柁g of Four 'a詑d Mao
Zedo花g?
Japan s wars of aggression and the eventual defeat can of course not directly be compared with
Chinas Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, but both events may tell us something about the
relation of the citizen towards his state. The Cultural Revolution was an event that Chinese
inflicted upon Chinese, and not just on orders of the leaders during the Cultural Revolution. To
many Chinese, it was a traumatic event that raised the question about how such an event could
occur in a country that had already embarked on the road towards modern nation building. The
hesitation to deal with this question is only partly explained by referring to the dictatorship of
the Communist Party.
The social effects of the Cultural Revolution
The end of the Cultural Revolution meant the end of an historic age. Individuals would start
asking questions about the how and why. The questions asked, and the answers given provide
clues not just about the tragedy of the Cultural Revolution, but also tell us about the relation of
diaries kept during the war are rather difficult to interpret for obvious reason-such as awareness of censorship. See, for
instance, Sen eki noomin heishi no tegami, Iwate ken nooson bunka kondankai.
67 I owe thanks to Norman Hu with whom　王　discussed these issues. On the reluctance of Japanese to address the
consequences of the war, see Gerald Sigal "How to Jibunshi , in Jornal of Asian Studies, November 1996.
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the individual Chinese towards his/her people, the nation, the state, and the Party. It is mainly
from this perspective that I should like to peruse some literary sources. By way of introduction,
a few words are needed about the social effects of the Cultural Revolution. It needs little
comment that once the Communist Party tried to distance itself from the Cultural Revolution, it
used its its age-old tactics of blaming past error on a small group of people who had illegally,
and temporarily, usurped party leadership. The monstrosity of violence, and the wide scale on
which society had taken part in the Cultural Revolution, did not lend credibility to this attempt.
Rather than blaming the state, to which the individual citizen had only a tenuous relationship
knowing that it was an instrument of power of the Party, the Party as such ought to have been
the focal point of massive blame. Apart from some dissidents such as WenYiZhe who dared
blaming the "Lin Biao system", fear of repression meant, however, that discussions focused on
blaming some individual leaders at the center, and some extremist leaders at the local, village
and neighborhood level. There were few voices blaming general features of Chinese society for
the relative ease with which the Cultural Revolution could spread through society as a whole.
The Cultural Revolution, through its actual administrative reforms in the People's Commune, and
through its actions in the course of "revolutionary activities" (zaofanpai), in fact often
strengthened pre-modern features of Chinese society. One such feature was that it increased social
control and isolation of one community from the other.68 In fact, immobility and traditional
features of Chinese society were still preserved in features of the People's Communes事　This
actually closed local society off from neighboring societies. Rather than just considering the Red
Guards as an anonymous nation wide phenomenon, it is essential to also study their activities as
part of inter-village and intra-village life.70 "Rebels" frequently preferred to take more drastic
action in a neighboring village than in their own.71 In some villages, villagers tried as much as
possible not to take part in excessive "struggles" against their covillagers. Very often, family
members and whole families were held responsible for Hcrimes" committed by one of the family
members.72　The Cultural Revolution exerted social and ideological control not just over an
individual, but families and villages as a whole-it strengthened "collective individuality.
Before the Cultural Revolution and its initial phase, the "Four Clean movement, party cadres
had usually still maintained social contact with families of traditional high standing, such as
when invited to weddings, but not on public occasions.73 Often, a village would suffer from the
tyranny of a local leader who used "class struggle" to maintain his personal power. 'Class
68 Zhang Letian Gaobie lixiang, p. 432, 436.
69 He Qinglian Xiandaihuade xianjing, pp. 288, 289.
70 Zhang Letian Gaobie lixiang, p. 210 ff.
71 Zhang Letian Gaobie lixiang, p. 432.
72 Zhang Letian Caobie lixiang, p. 211.
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struggle was not just a question of "genuine ideological" struggle. "Struggle" (douzheng) was
one of the means to terrorize local society and the country at large. Far from being an
intellectual discussion, it was the application of kangaroo court methods against individuals, not
just by an anonymous party organization, but by party members acting as local bullies using
abuse and physical torture.74 Long years of class struggle meant that some individuals were not
regarded as ordinary humans any more-they became nonpeople.75 This was not just by chance.
Systematic terrorizing required the continued existence of such nonpeople, termed class enemies,
who were usually not able to free themselves from this label:
Father died in the Cultural Revolution, and although he had tried to make all sorts of
contributions, he was not accepted by the revolutionary camp.7
In an apparent contradiction the totalitarian state does not allow anybody to live outside the
system, as to vividly describedy in an allegorical short story by Han Shaogong.77　Exercising
power over a community required the terrorizing of a few scapegoats. Needless to say, these
people did not enjoy the rights of citizen of the state. With the end of the Cultural Revolution
numerous people such as landlords and their relatives were suddenly elevated to the status of a
citizen (gongmin) of the People's Republic of China, in other words gaining certain rights,78
although this process might have taken more time in some areas than in others.
After the Cultural Revolutio柁　Chinese society returning to where?
The end of the Cultural Revolution did not, however, mark the beginning of a return to society
as it was before the Great Leap Forward. Despite the continuing political dictatorship of the
Communist Party at the higher levels, its role as a totalitarian party controlling all sectors of
society down into the villages was seriously undermined. At the same time, it strengthened the
revival of features of local society that the Party had attempted to eradicate.
"The cultural value outlook of the broad peasant population has not changed at all. In the
void, in the contryside society the obligations and custom of bonds among relatives (xueyuan
guanxi) very easily caused peasants to switch their reliance from administrative leadership
towards relatives and their strongmen.蝣�"�"The revival of clan norms (zongfa) in some sense
has created an environment where the individual is controlled by traditional clans in society,
73 Zhang Letian Gaobie lixiang, p. 437.
74 Lu Yuegang Daguo Guamin, p. 290f.
75 Liu Fangwei Fangzhu, p.487.
76 Han Shaogong Guiqulai, p. 238. Leo Ou-fan made some interesting comments on Han Shaogong in his article …on The
Margins of the Chinese Discourse. See also Curien, Annie HLa tentation autobiographique dans l'oeuvre de deux ecrivains
chinois contemporains: Han Shaogong et Shi Tiesheng." I owe these references to Mabel Lee.
77 Han Shaogong Guiqulai, p. 216.
78 Liu Fangwei Fangzhu, p. 480.
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and a reversal from a contemporary pattern of social responsibility [in the direction] of
"individual-state" towards the traditional pattern of "individual-clan-society　蝣蝣蝣　with its
latent danger for the state'
The Cultural Revolution as a Religious Phenome花OtL
The phenomenon of the Cultural Revolution and its effects can however only imperfectly be
grasped by reference to such social and political events. Below I will introduce in some detail an
essay on the Cultural Revolution by Wang Yi, who sees streaks of atavism and religious
madness on a large scale, which partly explain the cruelty meted out to political oponents, in
particular noneople-and thereby points to a feature that clearly parallels what happened in Hitler
s Germany.
'Even if the barbarity and cruelty of the Cultural Revolution makes us loath to look back,
at the same time, it is exactly our responsibility to explain its genesis from the beginnings
of our culture. s
Wang Yi subsequently describes in detail how classics of Chinese civilization, such as the
Shanhaijing, describe the early gods of Chinese civilization such as Fu Xi, Nuwa and Gonggong
as beasts with human heads, and this also applies to Xiwangmu. It was an age in which
frightened people attempted to defend themselves by driving out and killing "hungry ghosts. He
goes on to draw parallels between the language and images used during the Cultural Revolution
dealing with "enemies. Dormant ancient religious traditions such as digging up graves were
revived. -
'Violence became not just the tool of a small handful of henchmen, on the contrary, became
a holy duty of society as a whole, referred to in slogans such as "long live the dictatorship
of the masses .8
As in primitive religions, the vilification of others as devils was repeated during the Cultural
Revolution, a phenomenon observable in the religious courts of medieval age of Europe. Wang Yi
also refers to St Augustin who blamed all illnesses of Christians as being caused by ghosts.
Wang admits that in Chinese tradition there were similar prejudices against those of heretic
convictions and beliefs as well, as exemplified in prejudices against the Bailian teaching. During
the Cultural Revolution society saw itself as surrounded by myriads of evil and frightening
spirits {niugui sheshen)which demanded their cruel and ruthless extermination. Wang quotes from
79 He Qinglian Xiandaihuade xianjing, pp. 282 ff.
80 Wang Yi "Wenhua dageming yemanxing he cankuxing de wenhua genyuan‥ p. 9.
〉I
81 Wang Yi HWenhua dageming yemanxing he cankuxing de wenhua genyuan, p. 9.
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Mao Zedongs poem Dubaoshi of 1961 to demonstrate that these ideas can also be found in Mao'
s writings of that period. This went so far that in the mad environment of the Cultural
Revolution countless people imagined themselves to have become ghosts.8
Glorification of viole托ce during the eighties
The appearance of the glorification of local bandits and acts of violence during the eighties
should also been seen in the context of the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. It has been
argued that this tendency was in opposition to the attempt by the Party to obliterate this aspect
of China's past (in real and folkloristic terms). Rather than being a mere "search for roots"
(xungen) it certainly also contains worrying features in its nearly "romantic" details of physical
violence of barbarism during the civil war, the anti-Japanese war, and also during the Qing
dynasty. It is not surprising that some have discovered similarity to fascist thinking in such
stories. Similar to the description of bandits in the novel Shuihuzhuan, there is often little
distinction between mere bandits and fighters for justice, as in Han Shaogong's description of
violence during the late Qing period.8
'Some bandits changed into goverment forces, and then hung up posters announcing that
they were in charge of rooting out (other) bandits.8
Recently, a new study by Zhou Zhengbao has thrown new light on the portrayal of "war as a
phenomenon in Chinese novels.
The revival in the eighties of the glorification of local bandits (tufei) can be linked to views on
authority in a traditional peasant society, resulting in a peculiar view on morality.87　The
publication of studies on the superstitions of warlords must be linked to this general revival of
interest. Pan Xianwei points out that the rise of banditism usually occurred at times when
peasant discontent was on the rise, even before the outbreak of full scale peasant rebellion. He
sees in it a dangerous tendency exposing "weakness and blind actionism　{mangmuxing) of
peasants'.89 Qu Chunjing follows a similar argument.9
The Cultural Revolution was not merely the result of some political scheming by a few
82 Wang Yi "Wenhua dageming yemanxing he cankuxing de wenhua genyuan∴ p. 14.
83 For an example, see the short story by Mo Yan "Hong Gaoliang , pp. 164, p. 176.
84 See also Pan Xianwei "Lun Zhong Su Zhanzheng xiaoshuo shenmei de qutongxing he chayixing, p. 55.
85 Han Shaogong Guiqulai, p. 174.
Zhanzheng muguang.
87 Zhao Deli "Tufei shenmei; minjian quanwei de wenhua chans姑　p. 55.
Pan Xianwei …Lun Zhong Su zhanzheng xiashuo shenmei de qutongxing he chayixing, p. 59.
89 Qu Churning. "Fan shenhua yu wenhua dageming zai sikao, in a comment on the novels of Li Rui. In Chongxuan 90
nianday xiangcun xiaoshuo zonglun, Lui Yutang refers to the feverishyly mad and blind peasants, who in Hnormal times
are both pragmatic and weak (p. 34, p. 14).
90 Id., pp. 13-4.
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ambitious politicians, but there were also cultural reasons for 800 million Chinese falling into
this trap. [The writer] Li Rui exposed that tradition in our people (minzu).
Jin Dinghai refers to the Little Red Soldiers (hongxiaobing) during the time of the Great Leap
Forward (1958-60), who are now nearly forgotten but are clearly precursors of the Little Red
Guards of the Cultural Revolution.91 If we regard the rule of the Communist Party in China as a
Hsystem" it shows how such a system, despite claims for its moral character and ideals, misuses
and abandons those who engage in idealist actions. Any account of changes in China, whether in
the past or at present, must take into account the extremely important traditional division of
China in a people of peasants and those "above", a division which one may claim has led to the
existence of two Chinese "peoples" on Chinese soil, a division that includes different cultural
((
traditions. Communist guidelines for the mobilization of peasants during the antトJapanese war
bears witness to an awareness of these divisions.92　A recent short story by Han Shaogong
describes how a youngster in his twenties is sent to act as a cadre in a village he was not
familiar with. A local cadre instructs him how to deal with peasants.
"I tell you, dealing with the peasants requires first, intimidating them, and secondly
barbarity (yeman). With peaceful attitudes you get nowhere fighting down capitalism -"
The actions of the youngster-the narrator himself-actually result in the suicide of an innocent
young woman. While the party exonerates him, he gradually starts developing feelings of
individual guilt in a process of awakening.93 Such reference to a gradual awakening on the basis
of personal experience has become fairly common. Here Chinese writers emphasize an individual
morality that is not the outcome of teachings by any political or religious belief system. This
approach has the advantage that the writer need not expressly attack the role of the Party
System in order to make his point.
Its persuasive power is all the greater since the writer does not attempt to criticize on the basis
of arguments used by foreigners, which may all too easily risk being dubbed Hanti-Chinese ･
Liu FangweVs花ovel Fangzhu
This is clearly not the place to attempt a full interpretation of the novel Fangzhu (driven out,
banished), and a few references to some major themes have to suffice. In a way, the novel seems
to have been written also as a kind of history textbook for those young Chinese who have had
no personal experience of the Cultural Revolution and its background. From a literary point of
view, numerous didactic comments in the novel detract from its literary coherence. The novel
91 Jin Dinghai, pp. 167, 169.
92 Related aspects are dealt with in my study of guerilla mobilization and warfare entitled HNo Time for Revolution.
93 Han Shaogong Guiqulai, p. 8.
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does not only refer to events of the Hofficial", or formal history of the Cultural Revolution, but
also repeatedly refers to other important events, such as Liu Binyan's report Ren Yao zhi jian,
or the reminiscences of Yu Luoke's sister about her elder brother Yu Luojin, who had writen the
famous work Xuetonglun, at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, and who was executed.
There are two main protagonists, Zhuo Ran, who grew up in the countryside as if he were from
a peasant family, and Liu Beifang, the son of a famous general. Both belong to a completely
different social environment, Liu Beifang to the privileged urbanized military elite, Zhuo Ran
who suffers frome a deep inferiority complex because of his upbringing in the countryside. It
was a countryside in which not only the landlords, but also the children of landlords, "seeds of
▼I
landlord families , suffered deep discrimination.94　The so-called revolutionary, and therefore
unassailable cadre Wang Guosheng is the local tyrant who determines the fate of all the people
within the village, including engaging regularly in the rape of young girls and married wives
alike. He is the absolute perversion of the standard Chinese social image of officials/party
cadres as "fathers and mothers to people".95 Life wakes both of them in quite different ways to
the lies dominating their respective societies. It is significant that the change in Zhuo Ran's first
came about while in Beijing, where he observed and experienced a wave of "opening up policies
)I
(kaifang, usually wrongly translated as liberalization), not in the countryside. The life experience
of some protagonists reflects the harshness of Chinese society: "Human society was apparently
governed by a universal rule: 'the more a person is pitiable, the more life is cruel to him."9
There seems little trust in goodness:
"Since Darwin, nature had exposed to us the non-intentional (wuyizhide), great and at the
same time fortuitous work of creation (zaohua)." "What looks fortuitous to us, is merely a
specific happening of a more abstract necessity."97
Fate had linked the families of Zhuo Ran and Liu Beifang, allowing Zhuo Ran to use his
connection to Liu Beifang to save his father from prison. His father had been arrested without
further trial since he had dared to defend the true Mao by writing a letter to his successor, Hua
Guofen針needless to say, the letter never got there. While his father was imprisoned for a year,
Zhuo Ran heard from his mother for the first time about the vicissitudes in his father's life, due
to father s straightforwardness and his moral goodness.98 Mother told him that
"The treatment of prisoners in prison is very cruel, basically not the way the papers write,
as if prison implemented some kind of revolutionary humanism　-　Prisoners when just
94 Liu Fangwei Fangzhu. p. 388.
95 Ho Bozhuan, Shan ao shang de zhongguo, p. 301.
96 Liu Fangwei Fang.宕Am, p. 441.
97 Liu Fangwei Fangzhu p. 456; see also the passage on p, 487.
Liu Fangwei Fangzku, p. 240.
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relased have a very irritable temper, behave in unexpected queer ways, requiring slow
adaptation, time to treat the mental wounds inflicted on them. The reason why they were
persecuted was not at all because they had committed any crime, but just because they had
put forward suggestions to the party they trusted, about improving work, in a spirit of
serving high communist ideals.
The mental illness of Zhuo Ran s father did not improve, on the contrary, deteriorated, because
they did not have money for treatment. Two years after Maos death the Mao Zedong period
formally came to an end. With it, numerous nonpeople regained their citizen status. Mother said
happily,
The authorities have agreed that he should be treated like a retired person, saving the costs
of the medicine, This is all due to Great Man Deng Xiaoping-it seems that lately at a
certain meeting he had stated the three-nots (sanbu) were to be implemented, not to
"clutch tails", "not to use the stick", and not to force hoods on people's heads.
During the Cultural Revolution homes were often ransacked, and family members interrogated
about letters they had received, and even about those that had not even arrived.
Of couse he had his reasons to hate this, because it disrupted life in the family and meant
unjust treatment for his parents, but in another sense this meant that the outside world and
his family had an imseparable link, proved, that he and his families were not mere peasants
(tulaomao), and that they had wide social links and social background.ll
When the Mao era had ended. Liu Beifang eventually started wondering whether Mao s decisions
had all been wrong? The general could not get clear about this in his mind. If that was the
case, what about all the suffering for these long years? All in vain? 1W He eventually begins to
treasure independence of thought, because he clearly realized [now] that the reasoning used
in official utterances could not explain to him any more all sorts of things that happened in
real life.ll
The novel also introduces to us some young intellectuals who attempt their own, different
explanations of the reasons for the Cultural Revolution.
Now the Cultural Revolution was completely repudiated, the crimes and destruction to
society brought about by the Cultural Revolution, but why could it so easily be launched?
























Another one retorts that inequality in Chinese society, and the phenomenon of corruption, were
to blame. On this a third one comments that
"It seems that many foreigners study the Cultural Revolution, and have established the new
science of 'Cultural Revolution Studies". If it was really brought about by the corruption of
power, dont you think that corruption is now even more serious than at the beginning of
the Cultural Revolution?
Along letter (several pages in the printed novel) points out that individual morality had been
replaced by "the system 'long before the Cultural Revolution.
'In present society all courageously and deeply discuss the loss of morality, as if this was
the privilege of the Little Red Soldiers of the Cultural Revolution. In reality, however,
according to sources now available to us　蝣蝣�"this habit of encouraging people to expose and
betray each other started already during the movement "Catch the AB team in the period of
the Red Army, and matured during the "Yanan Rectification covement (1942). The Cultural
Revolutin merely saw a widening of this practice.
Great Country, Lowly People-the Reporting Novel Daguo g･uamin
The terror of the Cultural Revolution came to an end, but the consequences are still being felt.
Witness to this is the reporting novel by Lu Yuegang. It focuses on the attack of a husband on
his wife who seeks a divorce, as a revenge for this "insult by his wife. He disfigures her, by
pouring sulfuric acid over her. The application for divorce has its origin in a marriage arranged
by the girls parents from a poor village to a husband from a neighboring, prestigious model
village of national fame. That village regards the request for divorce as bringing intolerable
shame over the whole village, which also fears for the loss of national status as a model. The
crime of the husband up is eventually covered up by local, regional and provincial police forces
that conspire against justice. Relevant for the theme of this paper is that the Cultural
Revolution, far from liberating the individual, on the contrary strengthened the hold of local
"authority over the individual. Individual criminal responsibility is ignored. In his novel
Fangzhu Liu Fangwei commented that individual morality had been replaced by "system
morality when people began informing on each otheトa practice with a long tradition.105 As Lu
Yuegang stresses, the issue is not just vicious crime and unethical behavior, but the question
why society apparently tolerates and accepts such behavior in the period of the eighties when
the souls of Chinese who for a long time had been gagged, been isolated (fengbi) and
106 Liu Fangwei Fangzhu, p. 599.
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suppressed, was waking up.
Forgetting or Remembering?
In the end, moral judgement of the past not be the exclusive domain of historians or the state-
each individual shoud feel responsible as well. Towards the late seventies there was a wave of
rehabilitation for members of the elite, an issue that has still not been completely settled, vide
the recent book by the daughter of Luo Ruiquing, Luo Diandian Diandian jiyi (Scattered notes,
a pun on "diandian").m A recent issue of the literary journal Beijing wenxue　{Peking
Literature) commemorating the Cultural Revolution contains a number of contributions on this
issue.109
"The pupil of the primary school (of the days of the GPCR) is now married, and has now
her own daughter. She'd like to forget, but never can forget how she spit on teachers face,
doesn't want to tell daughter, can't bring it out　- those girl pupils who beat until blood
flowed, now a mother, but how to tell her children? or pretend to be forgetful? At peace, or
not?-
Later millions of people were living in the dark, hundreds of millions fell into a bottomless
dark cave; behavior of slave society, bound up in feudal society, aimless wars of the warlod
period, were all performed by putting out revolutionary slogans.
Temples thousand year old, city walls eight hundred years old, historic paintings and
writings, were all called Hthe four bad things", and all we could utter was one word:
1〉
"destroy"! What was destroyed in the ame breath was human norms, human feelings, human
))   ((
character, human civilization - we commonly call the Cultural Revolution a "nightmare , a
nightmare of ten years, "nightmare of our people"(jninzu emeng), or more popular "haojie
(wastage)蝣蝣�"but we can't build halls of remembrance, museums, and we dont have rules
for the compilation of official and unofficial histories of that period.�"�"�"This may be the age
of forgetfulness. Xianzhe has written a famous work called "For remembering what is
forgotten". This is a double irony of things that cannot be forgotten: abroad there is a
famous saying: forgetting history equals being sentenced. China we talk about 'forgetting
our roots". Most recently an entrepreneur has been collecting items from the Cultural
Revolution, and the motto of dedication in the catalogue is: a people good at forgetting is
107 Lu Yuegang Daguo Guamin, p. 32. In this context he also refers to the movie HBei aiqing yiwangde jiaoluo'(A corner
forgotten by love), id. p. 33.
108 Diandian juyi, Hongse jiazu dang'an, Hong Kong, 1998. She the review in Yaghou Zhoukan of March 29, 1999.
109 Beijing Wenxue, September 1998.
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sure to encounter great disaster. '
For better or worse, Friedrich Nietzsche warned against being stifled by the past.
There is a kind of insomnia, of wallowing in history that damages the living which
eventually perishes as a consequence, whether this concerns an individual, a people or a
culture. 'One needs to forget so that the past does not become the henchman of the
present. ni
In a globalizing world we need to study the influence of history, its traumatic and not so
traumatic events, on the minds of individuals, The relationship of individuals to their social
environment, to their place of work, to organs of the state is undergoing once more deep
changes, but processes of integration in a Hborderless" world do not automatically wipe out
memories. History is replete with memories of wars and violence that stigmatize peoples and
nations for generations, in its turn creating new enmity. The young generation is not guilty of
deeds committed by their mothers and fathers. The burden of the past creates responsibilities
that must not be forgotten, but stigmas of the past should not stand in the way of a more
peaceful future.
Unanswerable questions
The rationalization of- past disasters and traumas by the living is one thing-the unanswered
questions of the dying another. In the dramatic climax of the short story Hong gaoliang (Red
Gaoliang) by Mo Yan the dying heroine cries out:
Is this dying?蝣�"�"Heaven, Heaven gave me a lover, children, prosperity, 30 years of life as
110 Beijing Wenxue, September 1998, p. 43.
Ill Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm Vom Nutgen und Nachteil der Historie fuer das Leben, Leipzig, P. Reclam 1946.
112 Mo Yan Hong Gaoliang", p. 216 ff.
i A few references may provide the non-specialist reader with some impressions of the state of psychiatry in China. In the
first instance, Hong Kong Journal of Psychiatry (vol. 8 No. 1)August 1998 Special Issue: psychiatry in China; and also
articles in the Hong Kong Journal of Psychiatry vol. 7 No. 2 August 1997. Among better known studies,王shoud like to
mention Cooper, J･ E. and Sartorius, N. eds. Mental Disorders in China, 1996, Gaskell, London; Lin, K.M. "Traditional
Chinese medical beliefs and their relevance for mental illness and psychiatry," in Normal and Abnormal Behavior in
Chinese Societies, ed. by Kleinman, A. and Lin T.Y. D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, 1981; Pearson, V. Mental
Health Care in China: State Policies, Professional Services and Fatnily Responsibilities, Gaskell, London, Mercian
Psychiatric Press, New York, 1995; Pritchard, C. 1996 "Suicide in the People's Republic of China categorized by age and
gender: evidence of the influence of culture on suicide," Ada Psychiatrica Scandinavica 93: 362-367; Tseng, W.S. HThe
development of psychiatric concepts in traditional Chinese medicine. Archives of General Psychiatry (29, 4), 1973, 569-
577; Kleinman, A. Somatization: the interconnections in Chinese society a?nong culture, depressive experience, and the
meanings of pain, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985, 429-490. Hsu, J.　Tseng, W.S. Culture and Family
Therapy: Problems and Theraphy, New York, Haworth Press, 1991. Hsu, J. uFamily therapy for the Chinese: problems
and strategies, in Chinese Societies and Mental Health, ed. T.Y. Lin, W.S. Tseng and E.K. Yeh, New York, Oxford
UP, 1995. It is striking how few references are made to events during the Cultural Revolution as a specific cause for
disorders. This also applies to the bibliography in HApathy: case reports and a selected review of the literature," by Gabor
S. Ungvari, Helen F.K. Chiu and Linda C.W. Lam, in Hong Kong Journal of Psychiatry, 1997. 7(2)40-46. John J. Sigal
"The Nature of Evidence for Intergenerational Effects of the Holocaust", rev. of Martin S. Germann and Milton E,
jucovy, eds. Generations of the Holocaust. New York, Basic Books, 1982.
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rich as Gaoliang. Heaven, don't take from me what you gave me, spare me, save me.
Heaven, you judge me guilty? -　Heaven, what is truth? what is the true norm? what is
good, what is bad? You have not told me, and I have only lived according to my own ideas,
I love happiness, I love strength, I love beauty, my body is mine, I am my own master, I
am not afraid of having sinned, not afraid of having sinned."
-211-
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